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The study extends the debate on finance versus institutions and measurement of property 
rights institutions. We assess the relationships between various components of property rights 
institutions and private investment, notably: political, economic and institutional governances. 
Comparative concurrent relationships of financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and 
size are also investigated. The findings provide support for the quality of institutions as a 
better positive correlate of private investment than financial intermediary development. The 
interaction of finance and governance is not significant in potentially promoting private 
investment, perhaps due to substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in African 
financial institutions. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 
1996-2010. Policy measures are discussed for reducing financial deposits, increasing financial 
activity and hence, improving financial efficiency. 
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 The quality of institutions and financial development are, inter alia, critical 
determinants of a country’s investment climate1. This is essentially because investment is a 
forward-looking adventure and entrepreneurs are for the most part, looking for a secure, stable 
(Aysan et al. 2008 p.2) and financially appealing (Asiedu et al. 2013) environment in which to 
invest. There is a twofold interest in the above narrative. On the one hand, good institutions 
potentially mitigate economic uncertainties which promote efficiency and hence, positive 
investment decisions. On the other hand, a good financial environment offers more 
possibilities for private investment due to increasing financial allocation efficiency: the 
fundamental financial intermediation mission of transforming mobilized deposits into credit 
for private investment. In light of the above, good institutions and finance improve the climate 
of investment by enhancing efficiency and reducing the cost of doing business.  
 African countries have been characterized by a plethora of private investment 
unfriendly features, inter alia: low financial development and surplus liquidity issues 
(Saxegaard 2006; Fouda 2009; Asongu 2014a); poor institutional quality (Fosu 2013a, 
2013b); high infrastructural deficits (Asongu et al. 2018) and substantial levels of capital 
flight (Asongu 2014b; Boyce and Ndikumana 2001, 2003, 2011)2. This has led to a growing 
stream of studies in the African business literature on how to increase investment in the 
continent. The studies range from: broad determinants of investment (Anyanwu 2012), to 
country-specific solutions (Rolfe and Woodward 2004). 
 The experience of Zambia to attract investment after failed privatization and 
liberalization policies has implications for other African countries (Rolfe and Woodward 
                                               
1 The papers being extended by this manuscript use “property rights institutions” to measure institutions while 
we employ the six governance indicators of the World Bank. Hence, the term “institutions” is relevant to connect 
the positioning of the study with the literature motivating the paper. Hence, we use institutions and governance 
interchangeably throughout the study. 
2 Private investment and private domestic investment are used interchangeably throughout the study. 
Government dynamics refer to political, economic and institutional governances while finance dynamics 
constitute financial development proxies of depth, efficiency, activity and size.  
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2004). This has led to a growing body of literature on determinants of investment in Africa. 
Consistent with Asongu et al. (2018) and Asongu and Nguena (2014), documented factors 
promoting investment are multidimensional and complex. These include, inter alia: estimation 
methods, contexts of studies, data span and measurement of variables (Hajzler 2014; Moosa 
2002; Asiedu 2002; Asiedu 2006; Moosa and Cardak 2006; Sekkat and Veganzones-
Varoudakis 2007; Buchanan et al. 2012; Ranjan and Agrawal 2011; Asongu and Odhiambo 
2019a).  Hence, to the best of our knowledge, factors promoting investment in Africa which 
include institutions and financial development could be classified into two principal streams:  
business climate (infrastructures, trade openness, institutions, return…etc) and others (tenure 
security, weak land governance, regional factors, global economic shocks, resource-
seeking…etc). We highlight them in the following two paragraphs.  
 With regard to the first stream on doing business, Amengdolagine et al. (2013) have 
used 1400 corporations in 19 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to investigate the motives 
of backward investment nexuses to conclude that the main drivers include: time, local 
partners and market factors. Asiedu (2002) has documented infrastructural availability and 
return on capital as the main determinants in SSA. The roles of infrastructure, market size and 
trade openness (Büthe and Milner 2008; Vijayakumar et al. 2010;  Kinda 2010; Bartels et al 
2009; Jadhav 2012; Darley 2012; Anyanwu 2012; Bartels et al. 2014; Asongu et al. 2018)     , 
incentive packages and labor costs (Tuomi 2011; Vijayakumar et al. 2010; Bartels et al. 2014) 
have been documented as well. At the level of institutional quality: democracy (Asiedu and 
Lien 2011), government effectiveness & regulatory quality (Jadhav and Katti 2012), general 
domestic institutional quality (Asongu 2012; Neumayer and Spess 2005; Gastanaga et al. 
1998; Tuomi 2011; Kinda 2010; Bartels et al. 2014; Abdioglu et al. 2013; Cleeve 2012) and 
low levels of political risk (Busse and Hefeker 2007).  
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 While the above narratives sustain the need for positive signals like good institutional 
quality, the second stream which entails private investment in terms of foreign land 
acquisitions for the most part, suggests the contrary. For instances, inter alia: Areski et al. 
(2013) did find any significant nexus between the business climate quality and investment; 
corruption does not significantly discourage investment in the BRICS and MINT countries3 
(Akpan et al. 2018); Chinese investments in Africa are instead motivated by weak institutions 
(Kosltad and Wiig 2011; Asongu and Aminkeng 2013); weak tenure laws in foreign land 
acquisitions (UN 2010; Arezki et al. 2015; Economic Commission for Africa 2004;  Ingwe et 
al. 2010; Okoth-Ogendo 2008; Wouterse et al. 2011; German et al. 2011; Thaler 2013; Liu 
2013; Osabuohien 2014). Other motives include: resource-seeking interests (UN 2010; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2011; Jadhav and Katti 2012; Jadhav 2012; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 
2013; Rogmans and Ebbers 2013; Lay and Nolte 2014); global crises like financial and food 
shocks (Wouterse et al. 2011; UN 2010; German et al. 2011; Clapp 2014; Isakson 2013; 
Fairbairn 2013) and; regional features (Asiedu 2002; Anyanwu 2012; Aleksynska and 
Havrylchyk 2013; Amendolagine et al. 2013; Yin and Vaschetto, 2011).   
 In the light of above, the present paper contributes to existing literature in at least two 
ways. First, it extends the Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c) debate on the measurement of 
property rights institutions (PRI) and complementarities between institutions and finance in 
the promotion of private investment. While Asongu (2014c) has employed a composite 
institutional indicator instead of Polity IV as postulated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in 
the measurement of PRI, we still know very little about the types of institutions that are most 
favorable to investment4. This paper tackles this concern by further decomposing the 
                                               
3 While BRICS represents ‘Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa’, MINT stands for ‘Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria & Turkey’.  
4 “The Ali (2013, EB) findings on the nexuses among institutions, finance and investment could have an 
important influence on policy and academic debates. This paper relaxes his hypotheses on the conception, 
definition and measurement of finance and institutions because they are less realistic to developing countries to 
which the resulting policy implications are destined. We dissect with great acuteness the contextual 
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governance indicator into its political (voice & accountability and political stability), 
economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and, institutional (corruption-
control and rule of law) components. In essence, the paper’s curiosity of knowing how 
different dimensions of governance are associated with private investment could have relevant 
policy implications.  
 Second, the study also contributes to the literature by investigating how structural 
constraints to African development could be addressed (unemployment, surplus liquidity, 
business unfriendly climate…etc). With growing evidence that rising unemployment in the 
continent would only be absorbed by public investment in the future (Asongu 2013a), it 
extends the stream  of literature on promoting private investment (Anyanwu 2006) by 
assessing the role of institutions versus finance. By examining the complementarities of 
institution and finance, the study investigates whether the issue of surplus liquidity in Africa 
could be addressed complementarily with good institutions. We employ all the four 
dimensions of financial intermediary development documented by the Financial Development 
and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank for this purpose, notably: deposits 
(financial depth), credit (financial activity), efficiency (transformation of deposits into credit) 
and financial size.   
 In the light of the above, the paper is an applied econometrics study. Moreover,  we 
are consistent with recent literature in arguing that  applied econometrics is not exclusively 
based on the acceptance and rejection of existing theories (Narayan et al. 2011; Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 2016, 2018). Hence results from applied econometrics can also be the foundation 
                                                                                                                                                   
underpinnings of financial development dynamics and elucidate why the Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) 
justification provided for the measurement of property rights institutions (PRI) is lacking in substance. Using 
updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African countries, we provide more robust evidence on the substitution of 
institutions and finance in investment. Results under many baseline and augmented scenarios are not consistent 
with the underlying paper. Justifications for the differences in findings are discussed. As a policy implication, the 





of theory-building, especially when a study is positioned in the light of existing debates in the 
literature. 
 The intuition for multiple indicators of governance is consistent with an evolving 
strand of literature on the importance of unbundling governance measurements to avoid 
conceptual conflations and enhance policy relevance in Africa, notably: the role for formal 
institutions in building knowledge economies (Andrés et al. 2015); the incidence of mobile 
phone on governance (Asongu et al. 2019a); the use of governance variables to mitigate 
conflicts and crimes (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2016) and stimulate  innovation (Oluwatobi 
et al. 2015). Accordingly, by so doing conceptual conflation is avoided in the perspective that 
previous studies have used governance variables without due consideration to specific 
conceptions and definitions of governance dynamics. For instance, Kangoye (2013) has 
conflated corruption-control with governance because while the corruption-control dynamic is 
used in the empirical analysis, the term governance is employed in the title of the paper. We 
argue that governance is more holistic and can only be used within the framework of World 
Governance Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank if it integrates six dimensions, namely: 
political governance (consisting of political stability/no violence and voice & accountability); 
economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulation quality) and 
institutional governance (encompassing the rule of law and corruption-control control). It 
follows from the example that corruption-control used by Kangoye (2013) to represent 
governance is only one dimension of institutional governance. In the same vein, the rule of 
law is another dimension of institutional governance.  
 The distinctions above are also plausible from the corresponding definitions. In the 
light of the attendant literature (Andrés et al. 2015;  Asongu et al. 2019a): (i) political 
governance is the election and replacement of political leaders; (ii) economic governance is 
the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities and (iii) 
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institutional governance is the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them. It follows from the same example above that Kangoye (2013) has 
focused on a dimension of institutional governance, which should not be conflated with 
general governance.   
By extension to the more specific context of this study, Ali (2013) and Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) have been more concerned with the political dimension of governance. In this 
study, we depart from this narrow conception and definition of governance by distinguishing 
six main dimensions of phenomenon that are subsequently bundled into three more categories. 
Accordingly, while the Polity IV used by the contending authors was originally designed to 
measure durability of political systems, it is now being used to appreciate the quality of 
institutions and governance from a broader perspective. The rest the study is organised as 
follows. The data and methodology and discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the 
empirical results while Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 The study assesses a panel of 53 African nations with data of annual periodicity for the 
period 1996-2010 from World Bank Development Indicators. The choice of periodicity and 
countries has a twofold justification. First, we wish to remain consistent with the debate 
between Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c). Second, institutional data from the World Bank is 
only available from 1996. Moreover, of the 54 African countries, only South Sudan is not 
included in the sample because data for the country is not available before 20115. 
                                               
5 The 53 African countries are: “Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Chad, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,  Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe”. 
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 The dependent variable of Private investment is measured by Gross Private investment 
as percentage of GDP. Private investment within the framework covers gross outlays by the 
private sector (including private nonprofit agencies) on additions to its fixed domestic assets. 
Hence, the private investment only covers domestic private investment. The financial 
independent variables are appreciated in terms of financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size. The institutional indicators are extracted from Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) which is discussed in Section 2.1.1 below. The control variables include: 
inflation, trade openness and economic prosperity. Trade openness and economic prosperity 
are expected to improve private investment while inflation should have the opposite 
incidence. Accordingly, the former set is logically expected to be accompanied by more 
investment opportunities. Conversely, inflation is naturally a factor of uncertainty that 
generally plays out negatively by discouraging investment. The choice of the control variables 
is further substantiated in what follows. 
 First, trade openness which is understood as export plus imports of commodities (or 
goods and services) (% of GDP) has been documented in the literature to drive investment 
and economic development (Razin et al., 2003; Kandiero and Chitiga, 2006). Second, GDP 
growth also drives private domestic investment because it is associated with more avenues for 
investment that is needed to further boost economic growth (Dasgupta and Ratha, 2000). 
Moreover, GDP growth is preferred to GDP per capita growth because it is consistent with the 
prior studies that are being extended. Third, inflation is anticipated to negatively affect 
investment because investors have been documented to prefer investing in economic 
environments that are less ambiguous and/or stable (Zelekha, 2010; Kelsey and le Roux, 
2018). It is important to note that as apparent in Appendix 2, the mean value of inflation is 
comparable with those of other variables. Accordingly, in terms of mean values, units in 




decimal places can be involved in regressions with units in tens. Hence, taking a natural 
logarithm of the variables in tens of units in order to enhance comparability is not 
indispensible.  
 In GMM regressions, there is a choice between controlling for variable omission bias 
and having robust estimations that are not affected by instrument proliferation. Some GMM 
specifications do not employ control variables in order to avoid instrument proliferation and 
have robust models: “Our justification for employing two control variables in the GMM 
specification is very solid, because employing more than two variables will lead to findings 
that do not pass all post-estimation diagnostic tests owing to instrument proliferation, even 
when the option of collapsing instruments is taken on board in the estimation exercise. There 
is a choice here between having valid estimated models and avoiding variable omission bias. 
Hence, adding more control variables will produce invalid estimations (Bruno et al. 2012; 
Osabuohien and Efobi 2013;...” (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020b, p. 679). 
The above variables defined in Appendix 1 below are consistent with the underlying 
papers. While the dependent and control variables are in line with Ali (2013) and Asongu 
(2014c), the financial variables are consistent with the latter author. The composite PRI 
indicator of the latter author is decomposed into its political, economic and institutional 
dimensions to incorporate the motivation of this study discussed in the preceding section. The 
summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
respectively. The financial and governance variables are used distinctly in specifications in 
order to avoid concerns of multicollinearity apparent in Appendix 3.  
The financial variables are conceptually different and some have high degrees of 
correlations and thus, should not be involved simultaneously in the same  specification 
because when variables with a high degree of substitution are involved in the same 
specification, they enter into conflict and only a few emerge in the estimation output with the 
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expected signs: “The political indicators sometimes enter negatively and significantly, 
perhaps because the predicted components of the political and adaptability channels are 
highly correlated. Although we did obtain the same results when we added many additional 
instrumental variables, we interpret these results cautiously and note that they do not imply 
that the political channel is unimportant in general”  (Beck et al., 2003, p. 671). “Our sample 
comprises 43 countries with British common law, 61 countries with French civil law, six 
countries with German civil law and five Scandinavian civil law countries. We omit the 
Scandinavian legal origin from the regressions to avoid multicollinearity” (Beck et al., 2003, 
p. 663). It follows that estimated coefficients with wrong signs owing to multicollinearity can 
lead to misplaced policy implications.  
The adopted multicollinearity threshold of 0.600 is consistent with debates in the 
literature on multicollinearity thresholds: “…an extended analysis is engaged in order to take 
on board the concern about multicollinearity. A threshold of 0.600 is used because it is the 
average of 0.500 suggested by Wichers (1975) and Obrien (2007) and, 0.700 posited by 




2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 Consistent with the underlying literature (Asongu 2013b, 2014c; Amavilah et al. 2017; 
Ajide et al. 2019), there is potentially a very high rate of correlation or substitution among the 
governance indicators. This leads to some information redundancy. Hence, we employ PCA 
to mitigate the dimensions of the composite indicator employed by Asongu (2014c) into its 
economic, political and institutional components. The PCA is a statistical approach that has 
been substantially used in Applied Econometrics to reduce a large set of correlated indicators 
into smaller components of composite variables known as principal components (PCs). The 
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first PC represents a substantial part of variation or information in the initial data set. We use 
the Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criterion to retain the PCs for the various governance 
dimensions. These authors have recommended dropping factors with an eigenvalue less than 
one.  
In Table 1 below, the first composite indicator of general governance used by Asongu 
(2014c) is decomposed into Political governance (PolGov), Economic governance (Ecog 
Gov) and Institutional governance (InstGov). The governance dynamics all have an eigen 
value of above 1 with substantial variations relative to the initial dataset: 82.90% for PolGov, 
90.60% for EcoGov and, 93.50% for InstGov. Political governance captured by voice & 
accountability and political/no violence, is ‘the election and replacement of political leaders’. 
Economic governance which appreciates the formulation and implementation of policies to 
deliver the public goods is measured with government effectiveness and regulation quality. 
Institutional governance which is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that 
govern interactions between them is captured with corruption-control and rule of law. These 
definitions and measurements are consistent with recent institutional literature (Andrés and 
Asongu 2013). It is important to note that the Eigen vectors are orthogonal, which is 
consistent with the empirical literature using PCA (Tchamyou 2020a, 2020b; Asongu et al. 
2019b). The presentation of the principal component analysis output as well as the 
corresponding interpretation is consistent with the attendant literature in this section6.  
 It is also important to clarify that the categorization of the governance indicators into 
three main categories is motivated by two main factors: (i) it is the classification of the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank and (ii) the classification has been used in 
contemporary governance literature (Ajide and Raheem 2016a, 2016b; Asongu and Odhiambo 
                                               
6 It is important to note that: (i) the indicators load the way that they do according to the software used to derive 
the principal components. Accordingly, the indicators are simply fitted and the software program generates the 
groupings. Such grouping is consistent with recent literature (Asongu et al. 2019a, 2019b). (ii) Moreover, the 
indicators are interpreted the way they are presented because; doing so is consistent with recent literature 
employing principal component analysis (Tchamyou 2020a, 2020b). 
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2019b; Asongu and Nnanna 2019). Hence, while the attendant governance indicators have 
been criticized in the governance literature (Desbordes and Koop 2016), they are, to the best 
of our knowledge the most widely used because of their availability. 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
2.2.2 Estimation Technique  
 The Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation technique is employed 
consistently with underlying studies. The advantages of dynamic panel regressions have been 
substantially documented in the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2008; Asongu 2013c; 
Tchamyou 2017; 2019; Tchamyou et al. 2019a, 2019b; Boateng et al. 2018)7.  Two points are 
worth emphasizing in the goodness of fit. On the one hand, the conditions for the use of 
GMM are satisfied: N>T (53>5): On the other hand, the use of  three-year data averages 
enable us to restrict overidentification or limit the proliferation of instruments. Hence, this 
ensures that the number of instruments is consistently lower than the number of countries 
across specifications. If annual observations are used in place of data averages, in the post-
estimation diagnostic information criteria, the numbers of instruments are higher than the 
number of cross sections in each specification. Models with instruments higher than the 
number of cross section are invalid. Hence, the motivation for adopting data averages is more 
about obtaining valid model than a concern about slow moving variables. Another reason for 
the employment of the GMM is its relative advantage of controlling for two dimensions of 
endogeneity, notably: (i) the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time invariant omitted 
                                               
7 Relative to cross-country analysis, dynamic panel data analysis has three main advantages and one principal 
disadvantage. The former include: (1) the incorporation of both time-series and cross-sectional variations; time-
invariant omitted variables are controlled for, which has some bite on endogeneity; the System GMM approach 
eliminates small sample biases in the Difference estimator. On the latter, the estimates are interpreted as short-




variables and (ii) simultaneity or reverse causality with the used of internal instruments (Efobi 
et al., 2018; Meniago & Asongu, 2018).   
 The dynamic panel equations are as follows:  
titititititititititi IETFGovGovFPIPI ,,7,6,5,4,3,21,10,               (1)     
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi FGovFGovGovGovFFPIPIPIPI                     
)()()()()( 1,,11,,71,,61,,5   tititttitititititi IIEETT  ,                    (2) 
         
 where, i  represents the country and t  stands for the period in years. Tau  is three 
because we have used 3 year data averages. PI  measures private investment; F , represents 
financial development dynamics in terms of depth, efficiency, activity or size. Gov , denotes 
governance dynamics (political, economic or institutional); FGov , interaction between 
finance (F) and governance dynamics  (Gov); I , inflation; E , economic prosperity; T , trade 
openness; t  is a time-specific effects;  i  represent country-specific effects and;  ti ,  the 
error term. The use of interactive regressions is consistent with the problem statement and the 
two studies being extended which are also based on interactive regressions. Accordingly, the 
problem statement is to assess how the interaction between finance and governance affects 
private investment. Moreover, the specifications are consistent with contemporary GMM-
centric literature involving independent variables that are highly correlated (Ajide &  Raheem, 
2016a, 2016b; Tchamyou, 2020a, 2020b). 
 Consistent with Bond et al. (2001 pp. 3-4), the System GMM approach is preferred to 
the Difference estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998; Arellano and 
Bond 1991; Tchamyou and Asongu 2017). A two-step estimation procedure is adopted instead 
of a one-step approach because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent. Hence, the specification is 
two-step (i.e. with the use of robust heteroscedasticity-consistent standards errors) instead of 
one-step (i.e. with the use of robust homoscedasticity-consistent standards errors). The second 
order autocorrelation test in difference (AR(2)) and Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) 
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tests are employed to ascertain the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and instruments 
validity respectively. It is also interesting to note that the relationships between the 
independent variables on the dependent variable are not contemporaneous because in the 
specifications, lagged levels of the independent variables are used as instruments in the 
difference equation (Eq. 2) and lagged differences of the independent indicators used as 
instruments in the level equation (Eq. 1). This enables the exploitation of orthogonal or 
parallel conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term. 
 From the stationarity test, it is apparent that the variables are overwhelmingly 
stationary. Accordingly, based on the Fisher-type (Choi 2001) test, the variables are 
stationary. Given the unbalanced nature of the dataset, the following tests are not performed 
because they require the dataset to be highly balanced, namely, the: Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), 
Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000), Breitung and Das 2005) and Hadri (2000) tests. 
Moreover, the Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) test cannot be carried out owing to insufficient 
observations.  
 It is also worthwhile to discuss properties of identification and exclusive restrictions 
that are fundamental for the robustness of a GMM specification. Consistent with 
contemporary GMM-centric research (Nyasha et al., 2020), the identification process consists 
of disclosing three sets of variables, notably, the: dependent, independent and strictly 
exogenous variables. In the light of previous narratives, the outcome variable is private 
domestic investment while the independent variables of interest are the main channels (i.e. 
finance and governance dynamics) and elements in the conditioning information set (i.e. GDP 
growth, inflation and trade openness). The time-specific effects, lagged levels in the 
differenced equation and lagged differences in the level equation are the strictly exogenous 
variables. This identification strategy is consistent with contemporary system GMM literature 
(Haftu, 2019; Islam & McGillivray, 2020). 
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 Building on the attendant instrument variable (IV) literature (Agbloyor et al., 2013; 
Amavilah et al., 2017), in the GMM-IV approach, assessing whether the assumption of 
exclusive restriction discussed in the previous paragraph holds consists of demonstrating that 
the strictly exogenous variables have an incidence on the outcome variable exclusively by 
means of the main channels and elements in the conditioning information set. Hence, in the 
findings that are reported in the next section, the null hypothesis of the Sargan test should not 
be rejected in order for the assumption of exclusive restriction to hold. In other words, when 
the corresponding null hypothesis is not rejected, the strictly exogenous variables affect the 
outcome exclusively through the identified channels of finance, governance and control 
variables.  
 
3. Empirical results and discussion  
 
 There are two principal concerns motivating this section: (1) the independent 
correlations of governance indicators and financial dynamics on private investment and; (2) 
the combined correlations of governance and finance on the dependent variable. Tables 2, 3, 4 
& 5 assess the nexuses with financial depth, efficiency, activity and size respectively. The 
models are consistently valid across specifications and tables because the null hypotheses of 
the AR(2) and Sargan OIR are overwhelmingly rejected8.  
 In Table 2 below, the following findings could be established. First, while governance 
dynamics significantly and positively correlate with private investment, the nexus of financial 
depth (deposits) is not significantly correlated. The incidence from governance indicators in 
increasing order is significant in the political, economic and institutional dimensions. Second, 
                                               
8 As discussed in the methodology section, in order to investigate the validity of the models, two tests have been 
carried out. (1) The Arellano & Bond autocorrelation test which examines the null hypothesis for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. (2) The Sargan OIR test which assesses the null hypothesis for instrument 
validity. Hence, rejection of the null hypotheses of both tests across tables and specifications implies the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals and validity of the instruments. Therefore the models are valid. It is also 






the interaction of governance and finance on the dependent variable is not significantly 
correlated. This may imply financial deposits mitigate the positive relationship between 
governance dynamics and private investment. Third, the significant control variables display 
the expected signs. Accordingly, while inflation has a negative relationship with private 
investment because of an unfavorable investment climate, governance is endogenous to 
economic prosperity or growth in Africa (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2014).  
“Insert Tables 2 to 5 here” 
 
The results of financial efficiency (Table 3), financial activity (Table 4) and financial 
size (Table 5) below in terms of institution-, finance-, interaction- and ‘control variable’- 
correlations are broadly consistent with those of Table 2 above.  
For robustness purposes we performed the Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effects 
regressions using the lagged dependent variable and largely found that the coefficients for the 
lagged dependent variable are below 1.00 and lie between the Ordinary Least Squares and 
Fixed Effects estimates. We introduced the lagged dependent variable because doing so is 
consistent with Roodman (2009 p. 103): “Interestingly, where in our initial naıve OLS 
regression the lagged dependent variable was positively correlated with the error, biasing its 
coefficient estimate upward, the opposite is the case now. In the Stata examples, the estimate 
for the coefficient on lagged employment fell from 1.045 to 0.733. Good estimates of the true 
parameter should therefore lie in or near the range between these values. (In fact, a credible 
estimate should probably be below 1.00 because values above 1.00 imply an unstable 
dynamic, with accelerating divergence away from equilibrium values.)”. 
  
 
3.2 Discussion and policy implications 
  
 The results above have shown consistently across tables and specifications that the 
interaction between finance and governance variables is not significant in potentially 
promoting private investment. This is a serious concern because we have employed all the 
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financial development dynamics identified by the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank. This absence of a significant positive relationship 
between finance and private investment could be traceable to financial development 
inefficiencies that have been substantially documented in African financial institutions (Fouda 
2009; Saxagaard 2006). These inefficiencies ultimately lead to surplus liquidity issues owing 
to information asymmetry (moral hazard & adverse selection).  
Let us also discuss how the findings converge with or diverge from existing literature 
in two strands. First, on the former perspective, the findings are broadly consistent with Ahlin 
and Pang (2008) who have established a substitution effect: the positive impact of finance on 
growth decreases with the progress of institutions. Second, with regard to the latter strand, the 
absence of a finance led investment nexus is broadly inconsistent with the plethora of existing 
literature on, inter alia: developing (Ndikumana  2000, 2005; Xu 2000; Huang 2006); Asian 
(Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn 2005); European (Forssbaeck and Oxelheim 2008) and; 
developed (Love and Zichinno 2006)  countries. To be more specific about sub-Saharan 
Africa, Misati and Nyamongo (2010) and Afangideh (2010) have also established a positive 
nexus.  An explanation of this difference is that, the measure of financial development for the 
most part in the documented studies is money supply. Hence, as a shown by Asongu (2014d), 
this different is very apparent when all the dimensions of the Financial Development and 
Structure Database of the World Bank are employed in an analysis, notably: financial 
dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. In this paper, money supply is a component 
of financial depth.  
 Before suggesting policy recommendations that could be used in the fight against 
surplus liquidity, it is interesting to highlight how the financial variables employed in the 
study are: linked to each other and, related to surplus liquidity. Accordingly, financial 
allocation efficiency is the ability of financial intermediary institutions to transform mobilized 
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deposits (financial depth or liquid liability) into credit (financial activity) for investment 
purposes. Hence, the second indicator for financial efficiency may also be measured as a ratio 
of the third (financial activity) on the first (financial depth or deposits). Hence, high levels of 
financial inefficiency imply higher financial depth or liabilities and lower financial activity or 
credit. We suggest the following policy measures for reducing financial deposits, increasing 
financial activity and hence, improving financial efficiency. 
 We now discuss the appropriate policies that might be used to address the concern of 
surplus liquidity. Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the measures either target voluntary 
keeping of surplus liquidity or involuntary holding of surplus cash. First, voluntary keeping of 
surplus cash by financial institutions could be curtailed by: improving infrastructure in order 
to facilitate the transport of funds to remote bank branches, hence avoid them holding too 
much excess reserves; consolidation of establishments that would facilitate inter-bank 
lending, especially for contingency motives and; deterring of banks from holding reserves 
above statutory ceilings, by easing the huddles they face at the central bank in tracking their 
positions. Second, involuntary keeping of cash could also be substantially curtailed by: 
improving the structures and efficiencies of regional and domestic stock markets in order to 
expand opportunities of investment for commercial banking institutions; increasing 
competition and mitigating asymmetric information so as to reduce the reluctance of banks to 
increase lending; improving the ability of banks to increase lending, especially when interest 
rates are subject to regulation and; in order for banks to invest in bond markets, conditions 
that sustain bond-reserves spreads are necessary.  
 The above policy measures will offer greater possibilities for private investment 
because of increasing financial allocation efficiency. Hence, the fundamental financial 
intermediation mission of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment. 
Moreover, the interaction of enhanced efficiency with good governance institutions would 
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produce positive externalities in the investment climate by potentially reducing information 
asymmetry and the cost of doing business.  
 
4. Conclusion, caveats and future research directions.   
  
  The study has extended the debate on finance versus institutions and measurement of 
property rights institutions documented by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Ali (2013) and 
Asongu (2014). We have assessed the relationships between various components of property 
rights institutions and private investment, notably: political, economic and institutional 
governances. Comparative concurrent relationships of financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size have also been investigated. The findings provide support for the quality of 
institutions as a better positive correlate of private investment than financial intermediary 
development. Moreover, the relevance of the governance indicators is in the following order 
of increasing importance: political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance. The interaction of finance and governance is not significant in potentially 
promoting private investment, perhaps due to substantially documented surplus liquidity 
issues in African financial institutions. Policy measures have been discussed for reducing 
financial deposits, increasing financial activity and hence, improving financial efficiency. It 
important to note that when compared with institutional governance and political governance, 
we expected the financial measure to significantly interact with economic governance to drive 
private investment because by conception, economic governance provides economic 
conditions that can boost financial system credit and deposits.  
 On concerns that may arise pertaining to the sufficiency of data for the empirical 
analysis as well as the need to report a binning estimator (Hainmueller et al. 2018), it is 
important to note that in interactive regressions, only the concern of perfect multicollinearity 
is an issue because one of the perfectly collinear variables is automatically eliminated from 
the model by the econometrics software. However, the concern of high collinearity among 
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interacted variables is not an issue because the interacted variables are interpreted as 
conditional effects (Brambor et al. 2006). Hence, in the light of the motivation of the study, 
estimated interactive or conditional effects are used to draw conclusions and hence net effects 
or binning effects are not absolutely necessary. It is also important to note that the focus of the 
study on interactive relationships instead of binning relationships is because the studies the 
paper is extending have used a similar approach of conditional relationships. Hence in order 
to remain consistent with the underlying studies for comparative purposes, conclusions are 
drawn based on interactive or conditional relationships.  
 It is also worthwhile to articulate that there is sufficient data for the analysis because 
previous studies focusing on interactive regressions have exclusively focused on Africa with 
periodicities that are less than that employed in this paper (e.g. Asongu and Odhiambo 2020a, 
2020b). Moreover, the scope is Africa and the study has focused on all African countries for 
which, data were available at the time of the study. This clarification is essentially because 
Aronow and Samii (2016) show that “with an unrepresentative sample, the estimate of a 
causal effect may fail to characterize how effects operate in the population of interest” (p. 
250). Hence, in our study, the sample of Africa is representative because all African countries 
for which, data were available at the time of the study are engaged.  
As a caveat, the adopted estimation technique does not account for outliers which can 
influence the established relationships.  Hence, the established linkages may be different 
across varying levels of private investment, notably: low, intermediate and high levels of 
private investment. Quantile regressions (which assess the relevance of the independent 
variables on outcome variables throughout the conditional distributions of the outcome 
variables), is an appropriate technique to start with.  It is also important to articulate that 
sector- and country-specific effects are not taken on board because such fixed effects are 
removed by first differencing in order to eliminate the correlation between the lagged 
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dependent variable and fixed effects. Such a correlation which is a cause of endogeneity is 
theoretically and practically eliminated in Generalised Method of Moments in order to avoid 
endogeneity resulting from the underlying correlation. Hence, in future research, it would 
therefore be worthwhile to assess whether the influence of the independent variables of 
interest (i.e. governance and financial development) on private investment is the same across 
sectors and whether it varies depending on whether countries are resource rich or not. 
Moreover, while the concern of reverse causality has been partly addressed with the use of 
internal instruments, future studies can build on Ambraseys and Bilham (2011) to better 
address the concern.  
 Another caveat to the study is that WGI variables of the World Bank are perception-
based measures. However, they have been used in this study because they are the most widely 
employed in the literature. Moreover, we are unaware of alternative measures that articulate 
dimensions of political, economic and institutional governances as used in the study. 
Moreover, in GMM regressions, there is a choice between controlling for variable omission 
bias and having robust estimations that are not affected by instrument proliferation. Hence, 
the limited engagement of variables in the conditioning information set which is inherent to 











Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 




 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 0.773 4.642 
Second  PC 0.297 0.774 -0.369 -0.350 -0.021 -0.230 0.077 0.851 0.466 
Third PC 0.750 -0.300 0.353 -0.127 -0.223 -0.396 0.066 0.917 0.398 
          
First PC (PolGov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.170 1.000 0.340 
          
First PC (EcoGov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
          
First PC (InstGov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. PolGov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. EcoGov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. InstGov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 
Table 2: Financial Depth (Liquid Liabilities), institutions and private investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.460** 0.460** 0.407** 0.453** 0.453** 0.406** 0.468*** 0.468*** 
 (0.085) (0.017) (0.017) (0.048) (0.012) (0.012) (0.041) (0.005) (0.000) 
Constant  5.216*** 5.115*** 5.115*** 5.431*** 5.509*** 5.509*** 4.748*** 4.869*** 4.869*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) 
Growth  0.379** 0.286* 0.286* 0.322* 0.306* 0.306* 0.312* 0.283* 0.283* 
 (0.024) (0.069) (0.069) (0.062) (0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.030** -0.030** -0.000*** -0.025* -0.025* -0.000*** -0.029** -0.029** 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000) (0.072) (0.072) (0.000) (0.026) (0.026) 
Trade  0.015 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.008 0.008 
 (0.426) (0.792) (0.792) (0.810) (0.853) (0.853) (0.489) (0.713) (0.713) 
Fin. Depth (FD) --- 4.122 --- --- 1.234 --- --- 2.320 --- 
  (0.232)   (0.745)   (0.570)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.461 0.461 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.351) (0.351)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 0.998* 0.998** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.068) (0.068)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 0.839 0.839 
       (0.003) (0.135) (0.135) 
PolGov×FD --- --- -1.966 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.232)       
InstGov×FD --- --- --- --- --- -1.891 --- --- --- 
      (0.745)    
EconGov×FD --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.069 
         (0.570) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.742 0.742 0.775 0.732 0.732 0.783 0.728 0.728 
 (0.407) (0.457) (0.457) (0.438) (0.463) (0.463) (0.433) (0.466) (0.466) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 9.570 9.570 7.970 9.201 9.201 8.090 9.683 9.683 
 (0.419) (0.296) (0.296) (0.436) (0.325) (0.325) (0.424) (0.288) (0.288) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 42.34*** 42.34*** 217.76*** 73.09*** 73.092*** 233.26*** 71.072*** 71.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 41 41 46 41 41 46 41 41 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 141 141 162 141 141 162 141 141 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. The software omitted one of the constituent variables in the interaction because of perfect 





Table 3: Financial Efficiency, Institutions and Private Investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.345 0.345 0.407** 0.377 0.377 0.406** 0.398* 0.398* 
 (0.085) (0.168) (0.168) (0.048) (0.123) (0.123) (0.041) (0.068) (0.068) 
Constant  5.216*** 6.174** 6.174** 5.431*** 6.479*** 6.479*** 4.748*** 6.099** 6.099** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Growth  0.379** 0.358* 0.358* 0.322* 0.365* 0.365* 0.312* 0.327* 0.327* 
 (0.024) (0.066) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.073) (0.078) (0.078) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.000*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.000*** -0.025** -0.025** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.120) (0.120) (0.000) (0.035) (0.035) 
Trade  0.015 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (0.426) (0.305) (0.305) (0.810) (0.687) (0.687) (0.489) (0.444) (0.444) 
Fin. Efficiency (FE) --- -0.366 --- --- -0.755 --- --- -1.040 --- 
  (0.678)   (0.397)   (0.301)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.701 0.701 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.155) (0.155)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 1.287** 1.287** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 1.225** 1.225** 
       (0.003) (0.025) (0.025) 
PolGov×FE --- --- 0.174 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.678)       
InstGov×FE --- --- --- --- --- 1.157 --- --- --- 
      (0.397)    
EconGov×FE --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.824 
         (0.301) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.755 0.755 0.775 0.707 0.707 0.783 0.710 0.710 
 (0.407) (0.450) (0.450) (0.438) (0.479) (0.479) (0.433) (0.477) (0.477) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 6.850 6.850 7.970 6.798 6.798 8.090 6.689 6.689 
 (0.419) (0.552) (0.552) (0.436) (0.558) (0.558) (0.424) (0.570) (0.570) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 107.54*** 107.54*** 217.76*** 100.32*** 100.32*** 233.26*** 125.84*** 125.84*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 41 41 46 41 41 46 41 41 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 136 136 162 136 136 162 136 136 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. The software omitted one of the constituent variables in the interaction because of perfect 


































Table 4: Financial Activity, Institutions and Private Investment  
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment   
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.408** 0.408** 0.407** 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.406** 0.424*** 0.424*** 
 (0.085) (0.011) (0.011) (0.048) (0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  5.216*** 5.503*** 5.503*** 5.431*** 5.865*** 5.865*** 4.748*** 5.201*** 5.201*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Growth  0.379** 0.345* 0.345* 0.322* 0.342** 0.342** 0.312* 0.350* 0.350* 
 (0.024) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.047) (0.047) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.000*** -0.024 -0.024 -0.000*** -0.029* -0.029* 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.022) (0.000) (0.103) (0.103) (0.000) (0.050) (0.050) 
Trade  0.015 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (0.426) (0.467) (0.467) (0.810) (0.795) (0.795) (0.489) (0.478) (0.478) 
Fin. Activity (FA) --- 1.330 --- --- -0.718 --- --- -0.730 --- 
  (0.635)   (0.727)   (0.788)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.545 0.545 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.296) (0.296)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 1.198** 1.198** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.040) (0.040)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 1.108* 1.108* 
       (0.003) (0.074) (0.074) 
PolGov×FA --- --- -0.634 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.635)       
InstGov×FA --- --- --- --- --- 1.101 --- --- --- 
      (0.727)    
EconGov×FA --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.279 
         (0.788) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.727 0.727 0.775 0.708 0.708 0.783 0.674 0.674 
 (0.407) (0.467) (0.467) (0.438) (0.478) (0.478) (0.433) (0.500) (0.500) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 8.973 8.973 7.970 8.901 8.901 8.090 9.683 9.683 
 (0.419) (0.344) (0.344) (0.436) (0.350) (0.350) (0.424) (0.287) (0.287) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 49.950*** 49.95*** 217.76*** 73.18*** 73.18*** 233.26*** 85.55*** 85.55*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 41 41 46 41 41 46 41 41 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 141 141 162 141 141 162 141 141 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. The software omitted one of the constituent variables in the interaction  because of perfect 

























Table 5: Financial Size, Institutions and Private Investment   
          
 Dependent Variable: Private Investment  
 Political Governance (PolGov) Institutional Governance (InstGov) Economic Governance (EconGov) 
Priv. Invt. (-1) 0.370* 0.374 0.374 0.407** 0.415** 0.415** 0.406** 0.428* 0.428 
 (0.085) (0.101) (0.101) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.055) (0.055) 
Constant  5.216*** 3.651 3.651 5.431*** 5.422* 5.422* 4.748*** 4.620 4.620 
 (0.004) (0.302) (0.302) (0.002) (0.083) (0.083) (0.004) (0.113) (0.113) 
Growth  0.379** 0.322* 0.322* 0.322* 0.289 0.289 0.312* 0.261 0.261 
 (0.024) (0.071) (0.071) (0.062) (0.131) (0.131) (0.073) (0.179) (0.179) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.015 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.013 0.001 0.001 
 (0.426) (0.832) (0.832) (0.810) (0.725) (0.725) (0.489) (0.926) (0.926) 
Fin. Activity (FS) --- 3.575 --- --- 1.025 --- --- 1.183 --- 
  (0.304)   (0.774)   (0.749)  
PolGov 0.824** 0.687 0.687 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.047) (0.236) (0.236)       
InstGov --- --- --- 1.256*** 1.190** 1.190** --- --- --- 
    (0.002) (0.035) (0.035)    
EconGov --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.182*** 1.194** 1.194** 
       (0.003) (0.044) (0.044) 
PolGov×FS --- --- -1.705 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.304)       
InstGov×FS --- --- --- --- --- -1.570 --- --- --- 
      (0.774)    
EconGov×FS --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.075 
         (0.749) 
          
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.828 0.709 0.709 0.775 0.679 0.679 0.783 0.711 0.711 
 (0.407) (0.477) (0.477) (0.438) (0.496) (0.496) (0.433) (0.477) (0.477) 
Sargan OIR 8.143 8.543 8.543 7.970 9.356 9.356 8.090 8.022 8.022 
 (0.419) (0.382) (0.382) (0.436) (0.313) (0.313) (0.424) (0.431) (0.431) 
Wald  (joint) 213.47*** 239.57*** 239.57*** 217.76*** 243.25*** 243.25*** 233.26*** 262.95*** 262.95*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 46 45 45 46 45 45 46 45 45 
Instruments  17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 
Observations  162 156 156 162 156 156 162 156 156 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
Fin: Financial. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. The software omitted one of the constituent variables in the interaction  because of perfect 


























Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 






Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political 
pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to 
such policies.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies, and to deliver services.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 





Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-Control. 
The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General Governance  G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and Institutional 
Governances   
PCA 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth  GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness Trade Export plus Imports of Commodities (or Goods and Services)  (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Investment PrivIvt Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial  system 
Depth  
LLgdp Liquid Liabilities or Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Efficiency  
 FcFd Financial system  credit on Financial system deposit World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Activity  
Pcrbof Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System 
Size  
Dbacba Deposit bank assets on (Deposit bank assets plus Central bank assets) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. P.C: 
Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political 







. Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.730 -2.161 1.047 265 
Political Governance  -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Government Effectiveness  -0.678 0.610 -1.847 0.761 255 
Regulation Quality  -0.681 0.674 -2.573 0.868 265 
Economic Governance  0.049 1.310 -3.019 3.290 254 
Rule of Law -0.703 0.686 -2.550 1.018 265 
Control of Corruption  -0.598 0.622 -2.344 0.971 265 
Institutional Governance 0.008 1.378 -3.879 3.179 264 
Private Investment  13.075 9.115 -0.540 85.913 231 
Inflation 56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
GDP Growth 4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Financial Depth  0.254 0.214 0.023 0.962 205 
Financial Efficiency 0.748 0.414 0.158 2.575 195 
Financial Activity  0.197 0.239 0.007 1.681 205 
Financial Size 0.710 0.249 0.019 1.436 251 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix 
             
Financial Development Control variables Institutions Priv. 
Invt. 
 
Fdgdp FcFd Pcrbof Dbacba GDPg Trade Inflation PolGov InstGov EcoGov G.Gov  
1.000 0.078 0.689 0.456 -0.115 0.244 -0.066 0.458 0.677 0.589 0.616 0.165 Fdgdp 
 1.000 0.667 0.268 -0.075 -0.166 -0.119 0.104 0.162 0.290 0.211 -0.013 FcFd 
  1.000 0.431 -0.109 0.023 -0.068 0.365 0.537 0.603 0.540 0.077 Pcrbof 
   1.000 -0.083 0.154 -0.068 0.411 0.470 0.531 0.517 0.240 Dbacba 
    1.000 0.179 -0.132 -0.012 -0.084 -0.041 -0.049 0.536 GDPg 
     1.000 0.024 0.202 0.207 0.089 0.174 0.469 Trade 
      1.000 -0.114 -0.136 -0.169 -0.149 -0.089 Inflation 
       1.000 0.819 0.758 0.901 0.199 PolGov 
        1.000 0.878 0.957 0.220 InstGov 
         1.000 0.945 0.225 EcoGov 
          1.000 0.229 G.Gov 
           1.000 Priv. Invt 
             
Fdgdp: liquid liabilities. FcFd: Financial credit on financial deposit. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit bank assets plus central bank assets. GDPg: GDP growth rate. PolGov: Political 



















Acemoglu D, Johnson S (2005) Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy 
113(5): 949 – 995.  
 
Abdioglu N, Khurshed A, Stathopoulos K (2013) Foreign institutional investment: Is 
governance quality at home important? Journal of International Money and Finance 32 
(February): 916–940. 
 
Afangideh U J (2010) Financial development and agricultural investment in Nigeria: 
historical simulation approach. Journal of Economic and Monetary Integration 9(1): 74- 
91. 
 
Agbloyor, E K, Abor J, Adjasi C K D Yawson, A, (2013). Exploring the causality links 
between financial markets and foreign direct investment in Africa. Research in International 
Business and Finance 28(May, 2013): 118-134. 
 
Ahlin C,    Pang J (2008) Are Financial Development and Corruption Control Substitutes in 
Promoting Growth? Journal of Development Economics 86 (2): 414 – 33. 
 
Ajide K B,  Raheem I D (2016a) Institutions-FDI Nexus in ECOWAS Countries. Journal of 
African Business 17(3): 319-341.  
 
Ajide K B,  Raheem I D (2016b) The Institutional Quality Impact on Remittances in 
ECOWAS Sub Region. African Development Review 28(4): 462-481. 
 
Aleksynska M,  Havrylchyk O (2013) FDI from the south: The role of institutional distance 
and natural resources. European Journal of Political Economy 29 (March): 38–53. 
 
Ali A (2013) Are property rights and financial development complements or substitutes? Case 
of private investment. Economics Bulletin 33(2): 1126-1131.  
 
Ajide K B, Raheem I D, and Asongu S A (2019) Dollarization and the “Unbundling” of 
Globalization in sub-Saharan Africa. Research in International Business and Finance 47 
(January): 398-409. 
 
Amavilah V, Asongu S A, Andrés A R (2017) Effects of globalization on peace and stability: 
Implications for governance and the knowledge economy of African countries.       
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 122(September): 91-103. 
 
Ambraseys N, Bilham R (2011) Corruption kills. Nature 469(7329):  153-155. 
 
Amendolagine V, Boly A, Coniglio N D, Prota F,  Seric A (2013) FDI and Local Linkages in 
Developing Countries: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. World Development 50 (October): 
41-56.  
 
Andrés A R, Asongu S A  (2013) Fighting Software Piracy: Which Governance Tools Matter 




Andrés A R, Asongu S A, Amavilah V H S (2015) The Impact of Formal Institutions on 
Knowledge Economy. Journal of the Knowledge Economy 6(4): 1034-1062. 
 
Anyanwu J C (2012) Why Does Foreign Direct Investment Go Where It Goes?: New 
Evidence From African Countries. Annals  of Economics and Finance 13(2): 425-462.  
 
Anyanwu J C (2006) Promoting of Investment in Africa. African Development Review 18(1): 
42-71.  
 
Anyanwu J C, Erhijakpor  A E O (2014) Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in 
Africa? African Development Review 26(1): 15-37.  
 
Arellano M, Bond S (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies 58(2): 277-297. 
 
Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models.  Journal of Econometrics 68(1):  29-52. 
 
Arezki R, Deininger K,  Selod H (2015) What drives the global land rush? World Bank 
Economic Review 29(2): 207–233.  
 
Aronow  P M, Samii C (2016)  Does regression produce representative estimates of causal 
effects? American Journal of Political Science 60(1): 250-267. 
 
Asiedu E, Kalonda-Kanyama I, Ndikumana L,  Nti-Addae A (2013) Access to Credit by 
Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Relevant Is Gender? American Economic Review 103(3): 
293-97.  
 
Asiedu E (2002) On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: 
Is Africa Different? World Development 30(1): 107–119.  
 
Asiedu E (2006) Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural Resources, Market 
Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability. The World Economy 29(1): 63–
77.  
 
Asiedu E, Lien D (2011) Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources. Journal 
of International Economics 84(1): 99–111.  
 
Asongu S A (2012) Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in 
African Countries. Journal of African Business 13(3): 183-199. 
 
Asongu S A (2013a) How Would Population Growth Affect Investment in the Future? 
Asymmetric Panel Causality Evidence for Africa? African Development Review 25(1): 14-49.  
 
Asongu S A (2013b) How has politico-economic liberalization affected financial allocation 
efficiency? Fresh African evidence. Economics Bulletin 33(1): 663-676.  
 
Asongu S A (2013c) Harmonizing IPRs on Software Piracy: Empirics of Trajectories in 




Asongu S A (2014a) Correcting Inflation with Financial Dynamic Fundamentals: Which 
Adjustments Matter in Africa? Journal of African Business 15(1): 64-73.  
 
Asongu S A (2014b) Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy 
Harmonization. The European Journal of Comparative Economics 11(1): 93-122.  
 
Asongu S A (2014c) On the substitution of institutions and finance in investment. Economics 
Bulletin 34(3): 1557-1574.  
 
Asongu S A (2014d) Linkages between investment flows and financial development: 
Causality evidence from selected African countries. African Journal of Economic and 
Management Studies 5(3): 269-299.  
 
Asongu S A,  Aminkeng G A A (2013) The economic consequences of China-Africa 
relations: debunking myths in the debate. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 
11(4): 261-277.  
 
Asongu  S A, Apkan U,  Isihak S R (2018) Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in 
Fast-Growing Economies: Evidence from the BRICS and MINT Countries. Financial 
Innovation 4(1): 1-17. 
 
Asongu S A, Biekpe N,  Cassimon D (2020). Understanding the greater diffusion of 
mobile money innovations in Africa. Telecommunications Policy, 44(8) September 2020, 
102000. 
 
Asongu S A, Kodila-Tedika O (2016) Fighting African Conflicts and Crime: Which 
Governance Tools Matter? International Journal of Social Economics 43(5): 466-485. 
 
Asongu S A, le Roux S, Nwachukwu J C, Pyke C (2019a) The Mobile Phone as an Argument 
for Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Information Technology & People 32(4): 897-
920.  
 
Asongu S A,  Nguena C L (2014) Equitable and Sustainable Development of Foreign Land 
Acquisitions: Lessons, Policies and Implications, Handbook of Research on In-country 
Determinants and Implications with Foreign Land Acquisitions, First edited by E. 
Osabuohien, 12/2014: chapter Chapter 1: pages 1-20; IGI Global.  
 
Asongu S A, Nnanna J (2019) Foreign Aid, Instability and Governance in Africa. Politics & 
Policy 47(4): 807-848. 
 
Asongu S A,  Nwachukwu J C (2016) Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab Spring. 
Empirical Economics 51(2): 439-482. 
 
Asongu S A,  Nwachukwu J C (2018) Fighting Terrorism Empirics on Policy Harmonization. 
German Economic Review 19(3): 237-259. 
 
Asongu S A, Odhiambo N M (2019a) Challenges of Doing Business in Africa: A 
Systematic Review. Journal of African Business 20(2): 259-268. 
 
Asongu S A, Odhiambo N M (2019b) Governance and social media in African 
32 
 
countries: An empirical investigation. Telecommunications Policy 43(5): 411-425. 
 
Asongu S A, Odhiambo N M (2020a) Foreign Aid Complementarities and Inclusive Human 
Development in Africa. Journal of Social Service Research.  
DOI: 10.1080/01488376.2019.1612821. 
 
Asongu S A, Odhiambo N M (2020b) Insurance Policy Thresholds for Economic 
Growth in Africa. The European Journal of Development Research, 32(3), pp. 672–689. 
 
Asongu S A, Tchamyou V S, Asongu N,  Tchamyou N (2019b) Fighting terrorism in Africa: 
evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions. Empirical Economics 56(3): 883–933. 
 
Aysan A F, Nabli M K,  Véganzonès-Varoudakis M (2008) The Role of Governance 
Institutions in Private Investment  Decisions: The Case of Middle East and North Africa. 
Bogazici University, Department of Economics, Working Paper  No. 384, Istanbul.   
 
Bartels F L, Alladina S N, Lederer S (2009) Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues. Journal of African Business 10(2): 141-162. 
 
Bartels F L, Napolitano F,  Tissi N E (2014) FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: A longitudinal 
perspective on location-specific factors (2003–2010).  International Business Review 23(3): 
516-529.  
 
Blundell R, Bond S (1998) Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models.  Journal of Econometrics 87(1): 115-143. 
 
Boateng A, Asongu S A, Akamavi R,  Tchamyou V S (2018) Information Asymmetry and 
Market Power in the African Banking Industry. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management 44(March): 69-83. 
 
Bond S, Hoeffler A, Tample J (2001) GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models. 
University of Oxford, Oxford.   
 
Boyce J K,  Ndikumana L. (2001). Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimate of Capital Flight 
from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996.  Journal of Development 
Studies 38(2):  27-56. 
 
Boyce J K,  Ndikumana L (2003). Public Debt and Private Assets: Explaining Capital 
Flightfrom Sub-Saharan African Countries. World Development 31(1): 107-130. 
 
Boyce J K,  Ndikumana L (2011). Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages with 
external borrowing and policy options. International Review of Applied Economics 25(2):149-
170. 
 
Brambor T, Clark W M,  Golder M (2006) Understanding Interaction Models: Improving 
Empirical Analyses. Political Analysis 14(1): 63-82. 
 
Breitung J (2000). The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. Advances in 
Econometrics, Volume 15: Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels, 




Breitung J, Das S (2005). Panel unit root tests under cross-sectional dependence. Statistica 
Neerlandica 59(4): 414–433. 
 
Bruno G, De Boni R, Silvestrini A (2012). Do financial systems converge? New evidence 
from financial assets in OECD countries.Journal of Comparative Economics 40(1): 141-155. 
 
Buchanan B G, Le Q V,  Rishi M (2012) Foreign direct investment and institutional quality: 
Some empirical evidence. International Review of Financial Analysis 21(January): 81–89. 
 
Busse M,  Hefeker C, (2007) Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment. 
European Journal of Political Economy 23(2): 397-415. 
 
Büthe T,  Milner H V, (2008) The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing 
Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements? American Journal of 
Political Science 52 (4): 741–762.  
 
Choi I (2001) Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of International Money and Finance 
20(2): 249-272. 
 
Clapp J (2014) Financialization, Distance and Global Food Politics. Journal of Peasant 
Studies 41(5): 797-814.  
 
Cleeve E (2012) Political and Institutional Impediments to Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
to Sub-Saharan Africa. Thunderbird International Business Review 54 (4): 469-477. 
 
Darley W K (2012) Increasing Sub-Saharan Africa's Share of Foreign Direct Investment:  
Public Policy Challenges, Strategies, and Implications. Journal of African Business 13(1): 62-
69. 
 
Dasgupta D, Ratha D, (2000). What Factors Appear to Drive Private Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries? And How Does Official Lending Respond? Policy Research Working 
Paper. 2392. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
De Maria W (2010) Why is the president of Malawi angry? Towards an ethnography of 
corruption. Culture and Organization 16(2): 145-162.   
 
Demirgüç-Kunt A, Levine R (2008) Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run 
Growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4469, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
 
Desbordes R,  Koop G (2016) Should we care about the uncertainty around measures of 
political-economic development? Journal of Comparative Economics 44(3): 752-763. 
 
Economic Commission for Africa (2004) Land Tenure Systems and their Impacts on Food 
Security and Sustainable Development in Africa. ECA/SDD/05/09.  
 
Efobi U R, Tanaken B V,  Asongu S A (2018). Female Economic Participation with 
Information and Communication Technology Advancement: Evidence from Sub‐Saharan 




Fairbairn M (2013) ‘Like gold with yield’: Evolving intersections between farmland and 
finance”. International Conference, Yale University, September 14-15.  
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/6_fairbairn_2013.pdf 
 
Forssbaeck J,  Oxelheim L (2008) Finance-specific factors as drivers of cross-border 
Investment: An empirical investigation. International Business Review 17(6): 630-641. 
 
Fosu A (2013a) Growth of African Economies: Productivity, Policy Syndromes and the 
Importance of Institutions. Journal of African Economies 22(4): 523-551.  
 
Fosu A (2013b) Institutions and African Economies: An Overview. Journal of African 
Economies 22(4): 491-498.  
 
Fouda O J P (2009) The excess liquidity of banks in Franc zone: how to explain the  
paradox in the CEMAC. Revue Africaine de l’Integration 3(2): 1-56.  
 
Gastanaga V M, Nugent J B, Pashamova B (1998) Host country reforms and FDI inflows: 
How much difference do they make? World Development 26 (7): 1299-1314.  
 
German L, Schoneveld G, Mwangi E, (2011) Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition by 
Investors: Case Studies from Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Global Land Grabbing 6-8 April 2011. 
 
Hadri K (2000) Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data. Econometrics Journal 
3(2): 148–161. 
 
Haftu G G (2019). Information communications technology and economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A panel data approach. Telecommunications Policy, 43(1): 88-99. 
 
Hainmueller J, Mummolo J, Xu Y (2019). How much should we trust estimates from 
multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice. Political 
Analysis 27(2): 163-192. 
 
Hajzler C (2014). Resource-based FDI and expropriation in developing economies. Journal of 
International Economics 92 (1): 124–146.  
 
Harris R D F,  Tzavalis E (1999) Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels where the time 
dimension is fixed. Journal of Econometrics 91(2): 201–226. 
 
Huang Y (2006, July). Private investment and financial development in a globalised 
world. Department of Economics, University of Bristol, Discussion Paper No. 06/589, Bristol.  
 
Im K S, Pesaran M H,  Shin Y (2003) Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal 
of Econometrics 115(1): 53–74. 
 
Ingwe R, Okoro J,  Ukwayi J K (2010). The New Scramble for Africa: How Large-Scale 
Acquisition of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Land by Multinational Corporations and Rich Countries 





Isakson R (2013) Financialization and the Transformation of Agro-food Supply Chains: A 
Political Economy. International Conference, Yale University, September 14-15. 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/9_isakson_2013.pdf 
 
Islam  M R, McGillivray M (2020) Wealth inequality, governance and economic growth. 
Economics Modelling, 88(June): 1-13. 
 
Jadhav P  (2012) Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in BRICS Economies: Analysis 
of Economic, Institutional and Political Factors. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 
37(2012): 5-14. 
 
Jadhav P,  Katti V (2012) Institutional and Political Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence From BRICS Economies. Poverty & Public Policy  4 (3): 49-57. 
 
Jolliffe I T (2002) Principal Component Analysis (2nd Ed.) New York: Springer.  
 
Kaiser H F (1974) An index of factorial simplicity. Psychometrika 39(1): 31–36.  
 
Kandiero T, Chitiga M, (2006) Trade openness and foreign direct investment in Africa,” 
South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 9(3): 355-370. 
 
Kangoye T (2013) Does Aid Unpredictability Weaken Governance? Evidence From 
Developing Countries.  The Developing Economies 51(2): 121-144. 
 
Kelsey D,  le Roux S (2018) Strategic ambiguity and decision-making: An experimental 
study. Theory and Decision, 84(3): 387–404. 
 
Kennedy P (2008) A guide to econometrics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Kinda T  (2010) Investment Climate and FDI in Developing Countries:Firm-Level Evidence. 
World Development 38(4): 498-513.  
 
Kolstad I, Wiig A (2011) Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in 
Africa. Journal of African Business 12(2): 31-50. 
 
Lay J,  Nolte K (2014) Land grabs or simply investments? Determinants of foreign large scale 
land acquisitions in developing countries. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 
Hamburg, Germany, and University of Göttingen.  
 
Levin A, Lin C.-F,  Chu C.-S J (2002) Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-
sample properties. Journal of Econometrics 108(1): 1–24. 
 
Love I, Zicchino L (2006) Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: 
Evidence from Panel VAR. The Quarterly Journal Review of Economics and Finance 46(2): 
190-210. 
 
Misati R, Nyamongo E M (2010) Financial development and private investment in 




Meniago C, Asongu S A (2018). Revisiting the finance-inequality nexus in a panel of African 
countries. Research in International Business and Finance, 46 (December): 399-419. 
 
Moosa I (2002) Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice. London: 
Palgrave. 
 
Moosa I A, Cardak B A (2006) The determinants of foreign direct investment: An extreme 
bounds analysis. Journal of Multinational Financial Management  16(2): 199–211. 
 
Narayan P K, Mishra S, Narayan S (2011) Do market capitalization and stocks traded 
converge? New global evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 35(10): 2771-2781. 
 
Nyasha S, Odhiambo N M, Asongu S A (2020). The Impact of Tourism Development on 
Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, European Journal of Development Research: 
Forthcoming. 
 
Ndikumana  L (2000) Financial determinants of domestic investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa: evidence from panel data. World Development 28(2):  381-400. 
 
Ndikumana L (2005) Financial development, financial structure, and domestic investment: 
International evidence. Journal of International Money and Finance 24(4): 651-673. 
 
Neumayer E, Spess L (2005) Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct 
investment to developing countries?  World Development 33 (10): 1567–85. 
 
Okoth-Ogendo H W (2008) The Last Colonial Question: An essay in the pathology of land 
administration systems in Africa. In: Helge Onsrud and Elena Busch (eds.) Norwegian Land 
Tools Relevant to Africa Report, of a Workshop organized by the Norwegian Mapping and 
Cadastre Authority, 3-4 May 2007, Oslo (Norway), Hpnefoss: Norwegian Mapping and 
Cadastre Authority, February: 37-46. 
 
Oluwatobi S, Efobi U, Olurinola I, Alege P (2015) Innovation in Africa: Why Institutions 
Matter? South African Journal of Economics 83(3): 390-410. 
 
Osabuohien E S (2014) Land-scale agricultural land investments and local institutions in 
Africa Land Use Policy 39(July): 155-165. 
 
Osabuohien E S,  Efobi U R (2013) Africa’s money in Africa”, South African Journal 
of Economics 81(2): 292-306. 
 
Ranjan V,  Agrawal G (2011) FDI Inflow Determinants in BRIC countries: A Panel Data 
Analysis. International Business Research 4(4): 225-263. 
 
Razin A,  Sadka E, Coury T (2003) Trade openness, investment instability and terms-of-trade 
volatility. Journal of International Economics, 61(2): 285-306. 
 
Rogmans T, Ebbers H (2013) The determinants of foreign direct investment in the Middle 




Rolfe R J, Woodward D P (2004) Attracting foreign investment through privatization: the 
Zambian experience. Journal of African Business 5(1): 5-27. 
 
Roodman D (2009) How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in 
Stata. Stata Journal 9(1): 86-136. 
 
Rousseau P L, Vuthipadadorn D (2005) Finance, investment and growth: time series 
evidence from 10 Asian economies. Journal of Macroeconomics 27(1): 87-106. 
 
Saxegaard M (2006) Excess liquidity and effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence from  
sub-Saharan Africa. IMF Working Paper No. 06/11, Washington.  
 
Sekkat K,  Veganzones-Varoudakis M.-A. (2007) Openness, Investment Climate, and FDI in 
Developing Countries. Review of Development Economics 11 (4) : 607–620. 
 
Tchamyou V S  (2020a) Education, Lifelong learning, Inequality and Financial access: 
Evidence from African countries. Contemporary Social Science. 15(1): 7-25. 
 
Tchamyou V S  (2020b)  Financial Access, Governance and the Persistence of Inequality in 
Africa: Mechanisms and Policy instruments. Journal of Public Affairs, DOI: 
10.1002/pa.2201.  
 
Tchamyou V S (2019) The Role of Information Sharing in Modulating the Effect of Financial 
Access on Inequality. Journal of African Business 20(3): 317-338. 
 
Tchamyou V S (2017) The role of knowledge economy in African business. Journal of the 
Knowledge Economy 8(4): 1189–1228. 
 
Tchamyou V S, Asongu S A (2017) Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development 
in Africa. Journal of African Business 18(1): 24-49. 
 
Tchamyou V S, Erreygers G,  Cassimon D (2019a) Inequality, ICT and Financial Access in 
Africa. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 139(February): 169-184.  
 
Tchamyou V S, Asongu, S A, Odhiambo N M (2019b) The Role of ICT in Modulating the 
Effect of Education and Lifelong Learning on Income Inequality and Economic Growth in 
Africa. African Development Review 31(3): 261-274. 
 
Thaler K (2013) Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Social Conflict in Africa. International 
Conference, Yale University, September 14-15. 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/22_thaler_2013.pdf 
 
Tuomi K (2011) The Role of the Investment Climate and Tax Incentives in the Foreign Direct 
Investment Decision: Evidence from South Africa. Journal of African Business 12(1): 133-
147. 
 
United Nations (2010, January) Foreign land purchases for agriculture: what impact on 
sustainable development? Sustainable Development and Innovation Briefs  Issue  No. 8, New 




Vijayakumar N, Sridharan P, Rao K C (2010) Determinants of FDI in BRICS Countries: A 
panel analysis. Int. Journal of Business Science and Applied Management  5 (3): 1-13. 
 
Wei S.-J (2000) How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? Review of Economics 
and Statistics 82(1): 1–11. 
 
Wichers C R (1975). The detection of multicollinearity: A comment. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 57(3), 366–368. 
 
Wouterse F, Deininger K, Selod H, Badiane O, Swinnen J, Von Braun J, Zilberman D (2011) 
Foreign Direct Investment in Land in West Africa: The Status Quo, Lessons from Other 
Regions, Implications for Research. West & Central Africa Office Thematic Research Note 1, 
Washington.   
 
Xu Z (2000) Financial development, investment and economic growth. Economic Inquiry 38 
(2): 331-344.  
 
Yin J Z,  Vaschetto S, (2011) China’s Business Engagement in Africa.  The Chinese Economy  
44 (2): 43-57.  
 
Zelekha Y  (2010), The Effect of Uncertainty in Inflation Expectations on Private 
Investment, The IUP Journal of Monetary Economics, 8(4):14-22. 
 
